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PRACTICAL LESSONS FROM FAILURE OF A REINFORCED SOIL RETAINING
WALL ON A MAJOR HIGHWAY
P. Jagannatha Rao
Consulting Engineer
Faridabad, 121002, India

ABSTRACT
A “Reinforced Soil Retaining Wall” (RSR) wall of 10.5m height collapsed about 5 years after construction. HDPE geogrids were
used as reinforcement. The facia panels suffered outward movements during construction and the deformations continued to increase.
A 16m long stretch of the RSR wall failed and the failure wedge cut through four layers of reinforcement. The paper analyses the role
of different factors in causing the failure. Tension tests were carried out on the geogrids exhumed from the failed zone. A significant
loss in the strength of these grids was found which may be attributed to the high ambient temperatures in the area where the RSR wall
is located. The influence of other factors in causing the failure are also brought out and discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Reinforced soil retaining walls (referred as RSR walls) with
granular fill and high strength reinforcement are an
economical alternative to gravity as well as reinforced
concrete retaining walls. RSR walls were introduced in India
in the mid 1990 s, C.R.R.R.I.,(1995 ) and have steadily gained
wider usage. The RSR wall case study being presented here
was designed in 1999-2000 and built in 2000-2001. The RSR
wall started experiencing large significant outward
deformations during and after construction. By September
2006 severe distress was noticed in some stretches of the RSR
wall and the need for control measures was apparent. A 16m
stretch of the RSR wall collapsed in Nov 2006. Following the
distress and collapse, a detailed study and analysis of the
design and construction was carried out to identify the causes
for distress and failure and workout the remedial measures.

RSR wall, the height of the top most panels varied from 0.5 to
1.0m to fit with elevation of the top of the road pavement.
A starter length of geogrid of appropriate length was placed at
the required location, when the panels were cast. About
350mm length of the starter stub projects out of the panel.
The main reinforcement is connected to the starter by a
synthetic connector and spread out at the time of construction.
A capping beam of inverted U shape, 600mm wide, 250mm in
height was provided over the upper most panel and 50mm dia.
pipe post was attached to the coping beam A 1.0m wide foot
path of 600mm thick PCC with a steel guardrail along the
inner edge of the foot path were provided for traffic safety.

CONSTRUCTION DETAILS AND INITIAL DISTRESS
DETAILS OF RSR WALL
The maximum design height of the RSR wall is 10.5m.
Typical cross section of the RSR Wall along with the location
of the geogrid reinforcement at different levels is shown in
Fig.1.This configuration of geogrids is as provided at the
design stage and given in the design report prepared by the
design consultant. The rated strength of the geogrids used in
the project ranged from 45 to 160 kN/m (ultimate tensile
strength).The facia elements consisted of 2.0m high, 1m wide
RCC panels of 150 mm thickness. In some locations the panel
height was higher, at 2.5m.Also over most of the length of the
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As per construction guidelines, the initial batter to be provided
was 1 in 30, to be adjusted to 1 in 40 after the first lift. It was
also stated that the wall face would adjust to vertical after a
period of time. No details were provided as to how the batter
was to be maintained and checked.
As construction
proceeded, it was observed that the facia panels developed an
uneven profile and appeared to have moved outwards.
Construction was completed, reportedly, paying greater
attention to precautions such as ensuring no heavy compaction
equipment operates with in 1.5m of the wall edge, stretching
the geogrids taut before the fill material is placed and etc.
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Fig .2: Guard rail and pipe moved out of alignment due to
large outward movements of Facia Panels

Fig.1. Cross Section of RSR Wall as per Design Report
By mid 2001, construction work including the pavement was
completed. However, the outward movements of the facia
panels were found to be in the range of 200 to 250mm in the
highest sections of the RSR wall. Expert opinion at that time
suggested that facia movements shall be monitored regularly
for one year. The data obtained could be used to project the
future behaviour of the RSR wall. No such action was taken
possibly because the contract did not have any provision for
such activity. It was also felt that the wall movements would
stabilize as the construction gets completed. A set of
measurements taken in July2003 indicated a small increase in
the outward movements of the facia panels and on this basis it
was assumed that the movements were indeed stabilizing.
However, more alarming was the tilt and rotation of the
capping beam observed at many of the sections. Such
movements of the capping beam were visible at many sections
in 2004 and were of large magnitude where the height of the
RSR wall was maximum. In retrospect it appears that the
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significance of the tilt and rotation of capping beam was not
adequately appreciated at that time.
An attempt to prevent further movements of the capping beam
was made as follows: Temporary props were set up from the
ground level. Capping beam sections were pushed back, as
much as possible to their original position, and then were fixed
rigidly to the top most panel by brackets. However,
movements of facia and capping beam continued.
In Aug-Sep 2006, cracks appeared at the junction of the
pavement and the footpath. Gaps also developed between the
outer edge of the foot path and facia panels. The guard rail at
the inner edge of the footpath and the steel pipe post, both
located on the capping beam, got out of alignment (Fig. 2 ).
The facia movements appear to have attained alarming
proportions.
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Geogrids

Fig.3.View of collapsed RSR wall, Exposed Geogrids are seen over the collapsed fill
The deformations and movements continued and as per
information available outward deformation reached 400450mm at some locations. A section of the RSR wall
collapsed in Nov 2006(Fig.3). A wedge of fill material along
with facia panels fell outwards. In Fig. 3, Geogrids can be
seen hanging over the failure surface. The thickness of the
wedge at top was found to be ranging between 1.6 to 2.0m,
along the 16m of collapsed stretch. The failure surface
conformed very closely to a circular arc. The wedge extended
to about 4.5 to 5.0m down from the top.

the start of construction concluded that the design generally
follows the above code.

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF DESIGN

Choice of Reduction Factors

As per design document, the design follows the guidelines of
the geogrid manufacturer as well as B.S.8006-1995(Code of
practice for reinforced soils and other fills), which is widely
used in India and provides a conservative design. Although
the project requirements did not specify adherence to
B.S.8006-1995, an expert review at the end of 2000,i.e; before

The ultimate tensile strength of the geogrid is reduced by
reduction factors to account for loss of strength due to creep,
extrapolation of data, construction damage, environment of the
fill etc. The values of each of these factors are provided by
the manufacturer from carefully conducted tests. Of all the
factors creep is most critical and is also temperature
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However, detailed review of the project design indicated
significant deviations from the manufacturer’s design
guidelines as well as B.S.8006-1995.It was also found that the
properties of fill materials do not satisfy the requirements of
the project specifications. The impact of the deviations from
the design norms and inadequacies of fill material, on the
stability and deformations of the RSR wall is discussed in the
following sections
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dependent, more so in the case of HDPE geogrids.
Typical
value of cumulative reduction factor for HDPE grids is about
4 to 4.5, at 20 ˚C. The allowable stress determined as above
has the effect of keeping the initial and ‘end of design life
strains’ at low acceptable levels, thereby keeping the
deformations of the RSR wall at low values.

design friction angle has a large adverse effect on the level of
stability of the RSR wall.

It may be mentioned that even as at present there is no widely
adopted design methodology based on strain calculations.
Hence, adoption of proper values of reduction factors is
critical in the design of RSR wall. The manufacturer’s
guidelines have not provided values of the partial factors.
Instead a lumped parameter of 2.12 was provided. To this, an
additional reduction factor of 1.30 is applied to account for
construction, biological factors and junction strength. Thus the
cumulative reduction factor provided by the manufacturer
works out to 2.12×1.3=2.76.The manufacturer’s guidelines
also specify an overtension factor of safety of 1.50. Thus, to
derive the allowable or usable tensile strength from the
ultimate value, the reduction factor works out to
2.76×1.50=4.14.In further discussions, the values of 2.76 and
4.14 are referred to as overall ‘reduction factors’.

Table 1 shows allowable tension for the geogrids for the
following parameters:
(a) Combination of
reduction factor of 2.12 and
overtension factor of safety of 1.3,giving an overall
reduction factor of 2.76, as used in the design
(b) Combination of reduction factor of 2.12, overtension
factor of safety of 1.5 and global factor of safety of
1.3 as ought to have been used as per manufacturer’s
guidelines, giving an overall reduction factor of 4.14.

Length of Reinforcement
Further, the length of geogrid provided was 0.6H, where H is
the design height of the RSR wall, as suggested in
manufacturer’s design guidelines and no absolute minimum
length is specified. However, B.S.8006-1995 specifies 0.7H
as the minimum reinforcement length with 3.0 m as the
absolute minimum .Length of geogrid is critical from
considerations of global stability and pullout resistance. The
project RSR wall has adequate stability against global failure.
Safety against pullout is discussed subsequently.
Properties of Fill Materials
Project specifications required that the fill material shall be
predominantly coarse grained and not more than 10 percent of
particles shall be finer than 75 microns. No requirement of
minimum friction angle for the fill material was stipulated.
Tests on fill material carried out prior to the construction
showed the fines content to be in the range of 25 to 30 percent.
A few samples showed as much as 70-75percent fines. At the
same time test results were also given stating the angle of
friction to be in the range of 34˚ to 37˚. Even though the result
is incongruous, it was used as the basis of RSR wall design
with angle of friction as 35˚.
Subsequent to failure, fill samples were collected and tested in
independent laboratory. The results confirmed the percentage
of fines to be 30, but the angle of was found to be 29˚ only, a
much lower value. Considering the granular composition of
the fill material and compacted densities measured in the field,
the lower friction angle is considered representative of the fill
rather than the higher one. Clearly such discrepancy in the
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INFLUENCE OF REDUCTION FACTORS AND FRICTION
ANGLE ON THE DESIGN

Table 1 Effect of Reduction Factors on Allowable Tensile
Strength of Geogrids
Ultimate tensile strength
kN/m
Allowable tensile
strength kN/m (overall
reduction
factor =2.76)

160

120

90

60

45

57.9

43.4

32.6

21.7

16.3

Allowable
tensile
strength kN/m (overall
reduction
factor =4.14)

38.6

28.9

21.8

14.5

10.8

The design is based on friction angle =35˚, whereas test results
have shown this to be 29˚ only. Lower friction values imply
higher tensions in the geogrids for the same spacing. The
design adopts 1m uniform grid spacing. Table 2 shows tensile
force in the geogrids for friction angle of 35˚ and Table 3
shows that for 29˚, and the tensile force in the geogrids is
compared with allowable values for both the overall reduction
factors shown in Table 1. All comparisons are for design wall
height of 10.5m.

CALCULATION OF TENSILE FORCE AND PULLOUT
RESISTANCE
In the design report, tension in the geogrids was calculated
using the formula:
---- (1)
Ti = Thi + Tqi
where Ti = tensile force in the i th geogrid layer

= [K aσ hi ]Vi

---- (2)

4

and Tqi = tensile force from the uniformly distributed

Pullout resistance was calculated using the formula

surcharge on top of the wall at ith layer.

Pullout resistance of i layer,

th

Pγi = 2C po Lei σ vi tan φ

---- (3)

= K a qVi

---- (4)

K a = Coefficient of active earth pressure

Pγi = pullout resistance of i th layer

= 1 − Sinφ
1 + Sinφ

σ vi

φ = angle of fraction of the fill material

C po = soil – geogrid pull out coefficient (=0.85)

value of

=

(γhi + q ) = Vertical load on the ith geogrid layer.

Lei = length of geogrid in the resisting zone, in the i th layer.

φ = 35 0 was used in the report, and K a = 0.271

= Li - Lai

γ = unit weight of fill (18 kN/ m 3 )
q = surcharge (10.8 kN/ m )

Li = total length of geogrid in the i th layer.

Vi = vertical spacing of geogrids

Lai = length of goegrid in the active zone in the i th layer.

2

hi = height of the fill above the i th layer.
Table 2. Comparison of Tensile Force (ø =35˚) with Allowable Tensile Strength
Depth
from Top
(m)

Vertical
Spacing of
Geogrids
(m)

Ultimate Tensile
Strength
of
Geogrid (kN/m)

Total Tensile
Force (kN/m
ø=35˚)

Allowable Tensile
Strength
for
Reduction Factor
=2.76 (kN/m)

Remarks

Allowable
tensile strength
for reduction
factor =4.14
(kN/m)

Remarks

9.5

1.0

160

51.6

57.9

Considered
safe as per
design

38.6

8.5
7.5
6.5
5.5
4.5
3.5

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

160
160
120
120
90
90

46.5
41.3
36.2
31.1
25.9
20.8

57.9
57.9
43.4
43.4
32.6
32.6

-

38.6
38.6
28.9
28.9
21.8
21.8

2.5
1.5
0.5

1.0
1.0
1.0

60
45
45

15.7
10.6
5.4

21.7
16.3
16.3

-

14.5
10.8
10.8

Level of
safety is
not
adequate
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
Level of
safety is
adequate
,,
,,
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Table 3. Comparison of Tensile Force (ø =29˚) with Allowable Tensile Strength
Depth
from Top
(m)

Vertical
Spacing of
Geogrids
(m)

Ultimate Tensile
Strength
of
Geogrid (kN/m)

Total Tensile
Force (kN/m
ø=29˚)

Allowable Tensile
Strength
for
Reduction Factor
=2.76 (kN/m)

Remarks

Allowable
tensile strength
for reduction
factor =4.14
(kN/m)

Remarks

9.5

1.0

160

65.8

57.9

Level
of
safety is not
adequate

38.6

8.5
7.5
6.5
5.5

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

160
160
120
120

59.3
52.8
46.2
39.7

57.9
57.9
43.4
43.4

38.6
38.6
28.9
28.9

4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

90
90
60
45
45

33.2
26.6
20.1
13.5
7.0

32.6
32.6
21.7
16.3
16.3

Level
of
safety
is
adequate
-

Level of
safety is
not
adequate
,,
,,
,,
,,

21.8
21.8
14.5
10.8
10.8

,,
,,
,,
,,
Only this
layer has
adequate
safe

Table 4. Comparison of Pullout Safety for Different Friction Angles
Depth
from Top
(m)

Ultimate Tensile
Strength
of
Geogrid (kN/m)

Angle of Friction
of Fill ø˚

Failure
Length
(m)

0.5
0.5

45
45

35
29

5.21
5.90

Tables 2 and 3 clearly bring out the differences in safety level
of the RSR wall, based on the values of the parameters used in
the design vis-à-vis the more appropriate and realistic values.
From Table 3 it is clear that only the geogrid at elevation of
0.5 m from the top has adequate level of safety in tension.
Considering pullout, normally the top most layer is critical,
and the same is discussed now. Pullout is not directly
influenced by the allowable tensile strength of the geogrid.
The angle of friction of the fill has greater role as it influences
the tensile force, effective reinforcement length and the
mobilized pullout resistance. Pullout comparison for ø=35˚
and for ø=29˚ for geogrid length of 0.6H is given in Table 4
below for the top most layer of reinforcement.

Paper No. 5.36

Plane

Effective
Reinforcement
Length
(m)

Total Tensile
Force
(kN/m)

Pullout
Resistance
(kN/m)

Factor
of
Safety

1.18
0.49

5.41
7.01

28.03
9.29

5.11
1.33

It is seen from table 4 that with the angle of friction of the fill
equal to 29˚, the failure plane length is longer and the effective
reinforcement length is correspondingly shorter, the tensile
force is higher and pullout resistance is lower, as compared to
the values with friction angle of 35˚ and as a result the pullout
factor of safety is 1.33, which value is lower than the
minimum required value of 1.5.
From considerations of critical factors involved in the design,
viz. reduction factors used in arriving at the allowable tensile
strength ,factors of safety and friction angle of fill material, it
is clear that the design is very much on the unsafe side. The
nil or inadequate factors of safety in overtension imply that the
stiffness of the RSR wall is inadequate, ab-initio. This has
caused the wall to be susceptible to experience large
deformations, as indeed has been observed. Full scale studies
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on a HDPE reinforced soil retaining wall (Chew S.H.and J.K.
Mitchell 1996) showed that the wall movements are higher by
20% for reinforcement length of 0.6H, as compared to those if
the reinforcement length was 0.7H.
Discrepancy in the Spacing of Geogrids
Besides the above factors which have shown a cumulative
effect on the large and continuing deformations of the RSR
wall, a very unusual factor was found during the investigations
related to its distress and failure, and this factor had an equally
large destabilizing influence.

below the top of the RSR wall, instead of 0.5m below as used
in the design calculations. The design guide lines of the
manufacturer specify that the geogrid layer immediately above
the foundation level shall be spaced at not more than 0.5m
.However, in altering the vertical layout of geogrids to satisfy
this requirement, no attention was apparently paid to the
increased distance between the top of the RSR wall and
nearest geogrid layer.
Careful check of the drawings provided for construction
showed that most of the top panels, whose height is up to1.0m,
did not have any geogrid attached to them. The height of
these panels is between 0.5 and 1.0m, varying to keep in line
with the top profile of the RSR wall.
A pit was excavated adjacent to one of the panels, where the
height of the RSR wall is10.5m, and it was found that the top
panel of 1.0m height did not have any geogrid attached to it
and the geogrid was further 10cms below i.e; at a depth of
1.10m from the top of the RSR wall. Fig. 4 shows cross
section of the RSR wall with geogrid spacing in “as built”
condition.
Following the collapse and failure of the RSR wall, it was
found that in this section also, the topmost geogrid layers was
placed 1.10m below the top of the pavement level. Thus, the
excavation carried out earlier and the exposed geogrids
observed in the failed section, both confirm that the spacing of
geogrids adopted in the construction differs from the one
given in the design.

Fig.4.
Note:
1.
2.

Cross Section of RSR wall as Built

Spacing of lowest and top most grid differs from that
in the design.
Friction of angle of fill was found to be 290, thus
lower than assumed in the design.

It was found that the spacing of geogrids as adopted in the
construction was different from that given in the design report.
The change was made by the designer, without however,
evaluating the effects of the same. In the design report, the
top most geogrid layer was provided at 0.5m below top of the
pavement level with subsequent layers of reinforcement being
spaced at 1.0m intervals each. The stresses in all the geogrid
layers were calculated for this pattern of reinforcement layout,
as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4. On the other hand drawings
provided by the designer, for use in construction, showed the
lowest reinforcement layer at 0.5m above the foundation level,
with other layers being spaced at 1.0m intervals from thereon.
This has resulted the topmost layer being located at 1.0 to1.1m
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As a result of these of these deviations, over a large part of the
RSR wall the top most panels were just inserted into the ones
below and on sides. The capping beam was also resting on the
top of the poorly fixed top panels. This arrangement caused
the capping beam to experience large tilt as the top panels
moved outwards. Fixing of the capping beam to the top
panels was, hence of no use at all. In a ripple effect, the worst
placed top panels caused the panels by the sides and below as
well, to move out. Further, the panel shape was such that the
joints between the panels were continuous from top to bottom
of the RSR wall, and the width of the panels as well as the
geogrid was 1.0m.No overlap was provided for the geogrids in
their in their width direction. This combined configuration of
panels and geogrid had the effect of considerably decreasing
the stiffness of the RSR wall.
The large outward movements of the RSR wall are a
cumulative effect of the factors discussed above.
Results of Tensile Strength Tests on Exhumed Geogrid
Samples
As stated earlier, a part of the RSR wall collapsed in early Nov
2006.The failed wedge extends for about 16m length and 5m
depth below the top. The width of the wedge ranges from
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about 2.0 to 1.6m at the top. Four layers of geogrids failed in
tension and snapped at the junction with the facia panels. As
the fill soil and the facia panels fell down, the four layers of
geogrids were left hanging out of the fill. The ultimate tensile
strength of these geogrids was 45,45,60 and 90 kN/m in
sequence from top to bottom of the wedge.1m long samples
were cut from the top two projecting geogrids and were tested
for tensile strength in a reputed independent laboratory.
Geogrid samples from two lower layers were of inadequate

length for testing as the wedge narrowed down at these levels.
The results of these tests showed that current tensile strength
was less than the initial value as well as the peak failure strain
was lower. The stress-strain curves at the installation stage
and failure stage are shown in Fig.5. The strains in the
geogrids at the critical depths of 1.1 and 2.1m for the
calculated stress values (ref Table 4) are summarised in Table
5.

Fig.5. Stress-Strain Relationship of the Geogrid (UTS 45 kN/m) – at Installation and at Failure

Table 5. Comparison of Stress-Strain Curves for Failed
Geogrids
Tensile
Stress
(m)

Estimated
Strains
(kN/m)

Estimated
strains
at
design stage
(% )

Estimated
strains
at
failure stage
(% )

1.1
2.1

10.9
17.4

1.6
2.6

2.8
4.6
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Results of tensile strength tests show that the geogrids have
lost about 15% of strength during the period 2001-2006 i.e.
from installation to failure. Table 6 gives the comparison.
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Table 6. Comparison of Stress-Strain Relationship of Geogrids
as Installed and at Failure
At Failure

Tensile strength at
2% strain kN/m
Tensile strength at
5% strain kN/m
Ultimate tensile
strength kN/m
Ultimate strain %

As
Manufactured

Sample 1

Sample 2

7.69

6.0

11.0

18.5

19.9

25.0

38.0

37.2

45.0

15.0

14.5

11.0

The test results show that tensile strength at failure is less than
that at manufacture by as much as 16% and strains are higher
by about 35% as compared to the values at manufacture. The
loss of strength of geogrids is attributed to creep. High
temperatures in the area of location of the RSR wall also
appear to have increased the extent of loss strength due to
creep.
The failed wall has S-W exposure and wall
temperatures (˚C) would be in excess of 60 for atleast 3months
and in excess of 50 for another 3 months per year. The
manufacturer’s data for reduction factors does not provide
values for temperatures in excess of 30˚C. Further the designer
chose to adopt values of reduction factors applicable for 20˚C.
That the creep characteristics of HDPE geogrids are highly
sensitive to temperature has not been adequately factored into
the design. The collapse of the RSR wall can be attributed to
the rupture of geogrids which have lost part of their strength
due to creep. The project is located in hot semi-arid zone.
The average annual rainfall is in the range of 400 to 500mm.
There was no high rainfall in the weeks preceding the rainfall.
Rainy season normally ends in the middle of September.
Results of Stability Analysis
Stability analysis was carried out for circular failure wedges
5m deep and width of 1.6and 2.0m at the top. The trial
wedges formed a part of circular arc of 9.2m dia. and 9.33m
dia. for 2.0mdeep and 1.6 m deep ones, respectively. The
analysis was carried out using Bishop’s simplified method.
Angle of friction for the fill material was set equal to 290,as
determined from the post-failure tests. Fig. 6 shows the range
of the width of the failure wedge observed in the filed. Fig. 6
also shows the failure surface with 2m top width, which was
used in the stability analysis. The wedge was divided into 8
slices for the analysis.
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Fig.6. Section of RSR Wall showing Critical Surface Analysed
Remedial Measures to Stabilise the RSR Wall
Remedial measures to stabilize the RSR wall are presented
briefly. As the highway carries high volumes of traffic, the
road can not be closed even for a few days. Immediately after
failure, gabion wall, with stone backfilling and woven steel
mesh baskets was installed along the failed face for a length of
20m. Fig. 7 shows the failed section of the RSR wall along
with the gabion wall built to restore stability. The stepped
gabion wall has a base width of 8 m, with gabions of 1 m
height. The need for the urgent restoration of the highway to
uninterrupted traffic movement dictated the choice of gabion
wall as a stabilizing measure. Although gabion wall looks
unwieldy, it was installed very fast, in less than 7 days, largely
with manual labour.
Fig. 8 shows the cross section of distressed stretch, where 6 m
long nails were installed. The installation was done by drilling
a borehole of 50 mm diameter through the facia panel and fill,
and subsequently grouting the hole. The diameter of steel nails
is 20 mm. The average density of steel nails was on nail per
sq. m of face area. This remedial measure was carried out over
a 40 m of length of RSR wall which had experienced outward
movements of up to 450 mm. The RSR wall continues to be
under observation. Design of steel nails and related aspects are
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beyond the scope of the paper. This was completed within a
few days and traffic could move unhindered. In other sections
having severe distress and needing strengthening of the RSR
wall, 6m long steel nails are installed, at a density of one nail
per sq.m of face area.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM ANALYSIS OF FAILURE
Various deficiencies in the design that resulted in the failure of
the RSR wall have been discussed in detail in the preceding
sections. The lessons learnt from the analysis are summarized
in the following paras:
a)

Fig. 7. Stepped Gabion Wall Built to Protect the Failed
Section

Fig.8. Cross Section of RSR Wall with Steel Nails
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The reduction factors used in arriving at the design
strength values of the geogrids were low and lower
than the manufacturer’s recommended values.
Further, the creep properties of HDPE geogrids are
highly temperature sensitive and this factor was not
taken into consideration in the design.

As a result, the design stress values were higher than
desirable.
b) The fill soil had fines passing 75 microns in the range
of 25-30%. Still, the friction angle of 35 was
considered possible at the field levels compaction of
95% standard Proctor compaction density. However,
careful tests in independent laboratory showed the
friction value of the fill to be 29.This discrepancy
implies that the actual stress values in the geogrids
are higher than the values shown in the design. Also,
safety factors in pull out would be far less than
estimated, importantly, for the critical top layer.
c) The design adopted does not adequately conform to
the provisions of any design manual or code, but
chooses bits and pieces from such documents in an
arbitrary manner.
d) It appears that the large deformations observed ought
have been heeded as early warning signs. The
optimistic interpretation that wall movements would
stabilize following completion of construction did not
materialize. Each of the factors discussed in the
previous sections had the effect of lowering the
safety margin available.
e) It may be concluded that the failure was initiated as
outward deformations were accumulating with time
due to the high initial level of stress in the geogrids.
The errors in the spacing geogrids which resulted in
the top panels being left unsupported had also
aggravated the deformations.
Creep process,
accentuated by the high ambient temperatures, had
accelerated the progress of deformations. The error
in the spacing of geogrids leaving the top panels
unsupported triggered the deformation process, as
well as rendered their control difficult.
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It may hence be concluded that the failure is a
cumulative effect of the various deficiencies and is
progressive in nature.
f)

It is not the usual practice to quantitatively estimate
wall deformations nor is there any widely accepted
method for the same. At the point of time the project
was taken up it is indeed very rare to consider
deformations as apart of the design.
It appears necessary that future design methods and
codes establish reliable methods for working out
deformations and also their progression with time.

the structure as well as avoid costly remedial
measures at a later date.
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The present case study amply bears out the need for
the same.
g) When a structure under construction shows signs
distressed behaviour, it would be advantageous that
the structure is monitored irrespective of whether
such provision is available in the contract. Such a
step would help any changes to be made in the design
or construction at right time, ensure the stability of
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